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Abstract 
   This paper surveys the relationship between the government and the financial system in 
Japan, mainly from the viewpoint of financial stocks, to gain an overall perspective and identify 
where any problems lie. During this decade, it seems that the relationship between the 
government and the financial system in Japan has changed significantly. The government has 
generally become more deeply involved in the financial system. As a result it is no exaggeration 
to say that current Japanese financial system has become “a financial system of the government, 
by the government, for the government.” This was for the most part, promoted by the fact that 
there occurred a huge redistribution of wealth during the realignment process after the bursting 
of the bubble economy. Considering such circumstances, the aspects of “of the government,” “by 
the government,” and “for the government” will be surveyed in turn. Furthermore, postal system 
privatization will be discussed in terms of public debt management. Lastly, reference will be 
made to the possible problems accompanying the change in trend of investment-savings 
balances. 
 
   
 
I.  Introduction 
 
      In advance of other papers, this paper surveys the relationship between the government and 
financial system in Japan, mainly from the viewpoint of financial stocks, and attempts to 
identify where problems exist. In short, the purpose of this article is to present a clear, overall 
perspective, while other papers on this issue tend to examine individual aspects.   
   In this decade and some years, it seems that the relationship between the government and 
the financial system in Japan has changed dramatically. Consequently, the current situation of 98  K. Ikeo, Y. Goto / Public Policy Review 
Japan’s financial system could be expressed as “financial system of the government, by the 
government, for the government,” with a little exaggeration. This was, for the most part, 
promoted by the fact that there occurred a huge re-distribution of wealth during the 
realignment process after the bursting of the bubble economy.   
      In Section II, this paper looks back on this decade and some preceding years to confirm just 
how large the magnitude of redistribution of wealth was among sectors in the period. Based on 
this, we survey the aspects of “of the government”(Section III), “by the government”(Section IV), 
and “for the government”(Section V) in turn. Furthermore, Section VI discusses postal system 
privatization from the viewpoint of public debt management. Finally, reference to possible 
problems accompanying the changing trends in investment-savings balances will be made by 
way of a conclusion. 
 
II.  Perception  of  Reality 
    – “A Financial System of the Government, by the Government, and for the 
Government” 
 
     The Japanese economy has faced major problems since the bursting of the so-called bubble 
economy. Too much liability compared with the assets themselves has been left because of the 
decline in asset prices after the expansion of both real assets—which include stocks as claims on 
them—and financial liabilities. In short, there emerged excess liability in the Japanese private 
corporate sector. 
      Being wise after the event, the first phase of escape from this was the process of shifting the 
excess liability of the private corporate sector to the government. From 1990 to the beginning of 
the 2000s, the liabilities held by the private corporate sector were transferred to the government 
little by little through artificial effective demand created by successive economic policy 
packages, the offering of public money to the banking sector, and so on. 
   In consequence, restructuring of private corporate sector proceeded owing to the reduced 
burden of excess liability, which led to the foundation of the current recovery trend in the 
Japanese economy. In this sense it was not meaningless to transfer private corporate liability to 
the government for a while. Rather it was an inevitable process for alignment. However, it is 
clear that such transfer alone does not mean the end of the problem. Write-offs of the liabilities 
shifted to the government are indispensable to the final solution of the overall problem.   
      The current situation seems to move gradually into a second phase when we think of writing 
off the liabilities shifted to the government. As for monetary policy, to get out of a quantitative 
monetary easing policy has been recognized as one task, which means that we cannot expect a 
long lasting zero-interest rate situation. If normalization of interest rates is realized in the near 
future, maintaining the huge amount of public debt by the government sector becomes extremely 
difficult. That is, the emergence of symptoms of interest rate normalization demonstrates the   K. Ikeo, Y. Goto / Public Policy Review 99 
inevitability of a change of phase
1.  
      Since this paper does not intend to forecast future situation to no purpose, we only point out 
that the present time can be understood as a transition period from the first phase to the second 
phase in the sense described above. Following is a further study on what occurred during the 
first phase in more concrete detail. 
 
II.1.    Quantitative Assessment of the First Phase 
 
   Without a change in asset price or capital transfer, the sum of total net worth should be 
equivalent to that of the accumulated value of the previous net savings. If the sum of net worth 
becomes more/less than the amount of accumulated saving of each year, we can consider that 
there has been gain/loss by asset appreciation/depreciation and/or acceptance/payment of 
capital transfers. Credit losses with write-offs of bad loans are included in capital transfers 
from creditors to debtors in National Accounts.   
      Therefore, we can see the general impact of changes in asset prices by comparing the increase 
in net worth with accumulated savings. Such comparison using stock data of national economic 
account statistics is as follows.   
   First, in regard to the Japanese household sector (including private unincorporated 
enterprises), its net worth was 874,825.3 billion yen at the end of 1980. We only get 1,191,790.8 
billion yen adding accumulated net savings from 1980 to 1990 to the value above. But the actual 
net worth of the household sector amounted to 2,418,291.1 billion yen at the end of 1990. This 
means that the Japanese household sector obtained capital gains (plus net capital transfer) of as 
much as 1,226,500.3 billion yen. 
   In fact, the value of the household sector’s net worth was then at its peak and declined 
thereafter to 2,173,466.9 billion yen by the end of 2002. Taking account of accumulated net 
savings from 1991 to 2002, the household sector suffered from capital losses (minus net capital 
transfer) of 648,389.6 billion yen during that period. Nonetheless, it is only a little more than 
half of the capital gains obtained from 1980 to 1990. The calculation reveals summed up capital 
gains of 583, 110.7 billion yen from 1980 to 2002 belonging to the household sector. In this sense 
the household sector is in the “winners group.”     
  Seemingly, such results derived from the situation that the financial assets held by the 
Japanese household sector were concentrated in cash and deposits, which means a low ratio of 
risky assets whose prices are revised marked to market with the change in value of the 
underlying asset. Conversely, the damage of a fall in asset prices wholly concentrated in 
financial institutions, which guaranteed the principal value of cash and deposits as 
intermediaries, before they reached the household sector—the final owner of the corporate 
                                                                            
1  A similar recognition about the alignment process is also expressed by Mr. Hajime Takada (Chief 
Strategist of Mizuho Securities). 100  K. Ikeo, Y. Goto / Public Policy Review 
sector.  
    It can be shown that all sectors except households are “losers” using the same estimations (i.e. 
general government, non-financial corporations, financial corporations, and private non-profit 
institutions serving households; see Table 1). The general government suffered the greatest 
damage. Its net worth amounted to only 107,244.0 billion yen at the end of 2002. Probably the 
general government has had a practical deficiency of net assets, considering that it does not 
record actuarial reserves for obligation of payment by public pension funds
2. 
      The second greatest damage afflicted the financial institution sector. On the other hand, the 
damage to the corporate sector was unexpectedly small. We can guess that this quite significant 
relief from the impact of the fall in asset prices is owing to the abandonment of credit (which 
means capital transfers) by financial institutions.
3. In short, the decline in asset price hit the 
corporate sector directly, but its damage was shifted to the financial sector in the form of bad 
loans. Moreover, the government sector shouldered a serious burden in the process of support to 
corporate and financial sectors. The facts above provide an outline of what occurred in the first 
phase.  
      There has been a net loss (minus net capital transfer) of 1,423,787.1 billion yen from 1991 to 
2002 while there was a net gain (plus net capital transfer) of 1,581,039.3 billion yen as a whole 
f r o m  1 9 8 0  t o  1 9 9 0 .  B o t h  v a l u e s  b a l a n c e  r o u g h l y  w i t h  e a c h  o t h e r .  W e  c a n  s a y  t h a t  i n  t h e  
beginning of the 2000s, cleaning up after the bubble economy is finishing at last for the entire 
Japanese economy.     
      However, the Japanese financial system (which functions as a tool for wealth management) 
and the fiscal system (which functions as a tool for wealth re-distribution) were both 
remarkably influenced by the large-scale redistribution of national wealth among the various 
sectors, even if cleaning up after the bubble economy almost finished in terms of the 
macro-economy. In brief, the government became more deeply involved in the financial system 
during the process. Thus current situation of the Japanese financial system is just like “financial 
system of the government, by the government, for the government,” just like the phrase in the 
famous speech by Abraham Lincoln.   
   Part (i), “of the government,” here points out that confidence in the financial system has 
been mainly maintained by government guarantee (which is represented by a deposit pay-off 
moratorium) since the financial crisis in the 1990s. Next, part (ii), “by the government,” means 
the high proportion of the public channel (including activities concerning the public pension 
fund and central bank) in financial intermediation, and part (iii), “for the government,” refers to 
                                                                            
2  The Japanese government Balance Sheet (Trial Work) for FY2002 estimated that negative net worth of the central 
government in general government was 227.4 trillion yen at the end of FY2002. Here, the meaning of 
“negative net worth” for the public sector is different from that of the private sector, but at least it 
shows that the current structure of assets and liabilities is not sustainable. 
3  As shown in Table 1, the financial sector lost net worth of 95 trillion yen through write-offs of bad loans 
from 1991 to 2002.   K. Ikeo, Y. Goto / Public Policy Review 101 
the fact that the biggest debtor is the government itself, whose fiscal deficit is expanding.   
      Normalization of this distorted relation between the government and the financial system is 
one  of the  m aj or  pr oble m s to be sol ve d in the  m edi um te rm.  More  de ta il s of eac h a spec t of 














































Table 1: Difference between Increase in Net Worth and Accumulated Savings 
Full Period:1980-2002  (Trillion Yen） 
Capital Transactions during the Period  "Change in Net Worth"-"Accumulated Savings" 
Financial Instrument  Volume of Financial Instruments  Revaluation 






Savings    Real 













(decrease)  Write-off 















General Government  -36  156  150  430  -280  344  -624  -193  -7  -6  -2  1  0  -117  -89  5  -33  -63  -45  39 
Households  1299  721  789  14  775  1050  -275  578  -4  -2  -24  23  18  629  583  45  0  -115  -51  119 
Non-financial Corporations  144  223  365  616  -251  266  -517  -79  26  -5  -25  56  57  -134  -21  69  -181  -113  79  62 
Financial Corporations  0  136  -25  16  -41  2150  -2191  -136  0  0  -90  90  13  5  -15  91  -71  20  7  -168 
（Change caused by 
write-off of bad loan）          ( -98)     
Private Non-Profit Institutions  29  42  33  17  16  27  -11  -13  -3  0  -4  2  2  5  4  1  0  -7  1  -10 
Total  1435 
 
1278  1312  1093  218  3837  -3619  157  13  -13  -145 172  90  389  463  211  -285  -279  -9  42 
1980-1990 
Capital Transactions during the Period  "Change in Net Worth"-"Accumulated Savings" 
Financial Instrument  Volume of Financial Instruments  Revaluation 






Savings    Real 













(decrease)  Write-off 















General Government  205  124  124  156  -32  151  -183  81  0  -2  -2  4  0  104  94  1  9  -23  0  0 
Households  1543  317  367  -4  371  571  -199  1227  -14  0  -24  10  1  1241  1148  93  0  -51  -18  68 
Non-financial Corporations  308  109  124  334  -210  322  -532  199  -27  0  2  -29  2  253  392  125  -264  -42  15  -1 
Financial Corporations  77  23  -44  19  -63  1459  -1522  53  79  0  2  77  0  38  72  102  -135  3  0  -67 
（Change caused by 
write-off of bad loan）                     (  -3) 
                   
Private Non-Profit Institutions  39  18  20  8  13  21  -9  21  -4  0  -4  0  0  26  26  0  0  -4  0  2 
Total  2173 
 
592  592  513  79  2524  -2445  1581  34  -2  -26 62  3  1663  1731  322  -391  -115  -1  1 
1991-2002 
Capital Transactions during the Period  "Change in Net Worth"-"Accumulated Savings" 
Financial Instrument  Volume of Financial Instruments  Revaluation 






Savings    Real 













(decrease)  Write-off 















General Government  -241  32  26  274  -248  193  -442  -274  -6  -3  0  -3  0  -220  -182  3  -42  -41  -45  39 
Households  -245  404  422  18  403  479  -76  -648  11  -2  0  13  17  -613  -565  -48  0  -65  -34  52 
Non-financial Corporations  -164  114  241  282  -41  -56  15  -278  53  -5  -27  85  55  -386  -413  -56  83  -71  64  63 
Financial Corporations  -77  113  18  -3  22  691  -669  -189  -79  0  -92  13  13  -33  -87  -11  64  17  7  -101 
（Change caused by 
write-off of bad loan）                     (-95)                  
Private Non-Profit Institutions  -10  24  13  9  4  6  -2  -34  1  0  0  2  2  -21  -22  1  0  -4  1  -11 
Total  -737 
 
686  720  580  140  1313  -1174  -1424  -20  -11  -119 109  87  -1274  -1269  -110  105  -163  -7  41 
Note 1: “Capital Transactions during the Period” = “Savings” + “Fiscal Transfers” + “Discrepancy” 
Note 2: Write-off of bad loan is sum of direct write-off and additional individual loan-loss reserves. 
Note 3: “Others” are differences due to differences between estimation method of depreciation of closing stock and that of transaction flow. 
Note 4: “Fiscal capital transfer” is “capital subsidy” etc. 
Note 5: “Discrepancy” is difference between “balance of saving and investment” in SNA and “financial surplus or deficit” in Flow of Funds.   K. Ikeo, Y. Goto / Public Policy Review 103 
III.    The Cost of the Financial Safety Net 
 
      After the bursting of the bubble economy, the Japanese banking sector bore huge amount of 
non-performing loan. Although the decline in land prices came later than the decline in stock 
prices, people had more recognition that asset prices in general were falling and the first 
anxieties over the financial system emerged around the fears for the financial situation of the 
banking sector, in the summer of 1992. 
   However, at first there was little understanding of the seriousness of the situation among 
financial institutions, regulatory authorities, and the general public throughout the nation. This 
was because there was an expectation of an imminent recovery based on deep-rooted prospects 
for the recovery of asset prices. That was why the policy response was only to patch situations 
up and to play for time throughout 1992–94, and no drastic measures were taken to resolve the 
non-performing loan problem.   
      In fact, however, far from recovery there was a further decline in asset prices. The response 
of playing for time produced a result completely opposite to what was expected, only causing a 
deterioration of the problem. Beginning with the bankruptcies of two credit unions in Tokyo in 
December 1994, failures of other financial institutions succeeded, and at last this resulted in the 
situation of several high-level bankruptcies of financial institutions in the autumn of 1997.   
   During this period there was strong antipathy against any injection of public funds among 
people, because of the process of dealing with the failed housing loan companies between 
end-95 to mid-96. But finally confronted by a large-scale financial crisis, public sentiment arose 
to allow the government to use public money. Thereafter, the situation has continued that the 
extensive safety net supplied by the government has supported national confidence in financial 
system.  
      This represents the aspect of (i) “of the government,” while things have gradually improved 
as the freeze on the payoff system (which made deposit guarantee’s scope unlimited) introduced 
in 1995 was at last completely lifted in April 2005. As for the major banks, however, there still 
remains a big difference between the financial ratings, which include the possibility of public 
support, and those that do not. In addition, as for small and medium-sized, or regional financial 
institutions, a wide variance exists and there seems to be some institutions that still have 
problems.
4. Thus the situation mentioned above has not been completely resolved.   
   We must also notice that an enough safety net naturally leads to quite large fiscal 
expenditure in a direct or indirect way. Let us examine the cost of the safety net next. In this 
context it is too restrictive to deal with only (a) public funds injected into the banking sector. 
In other words, important components of policies to stabilize the financial system are regarded 
as including (b) measures to back up corporate cash flows by government-affiliated financial 
                                                                            
4  For the current situation and perspective of regional financial institutions, see the paper by Yasushi 
Horie. 104  K. Ikeo, Y. Goto / Public Policy Review 
institutions, and (c) a credit guarantee system. At the same time these two might also produce a 
new large direct or indirect fiscal burden. 
 
III.1.    Public Funds into Banks 
 
   Various fiscal measures have been implemented through the deposit insurance system in 
order to use public money for supporting banks. Some point out that the amount of public funds 
(including some deposit insurance premiums as a funding resource) directly used to stabilize the 
financial system is 35.8 trillion yen. Capital injection is 12.4 trillion yen (2.2 trillion yen has 
been repaid), financial assistance by grants is 18.6 trillion yen (taxpayers’ burden of 10.4 trillion 
yen has become certain), and assistance by asset purchases is 9.6 trillion yen (5 trillion yen has 
been repaid). 
    Not only public debt but also an actual loss has come into being, and some part has become a 
burden on taxpayers, the amount of which has been fixed as mentioned above. Table 3 shows 
such situation. On the other hand, it is certain that such assistance to banks by the government 
has to some extent contributed to recovering confidence in the financial system. As in Figure 1, 
the risk premium (which is measured by the difference of borrowing interest rate between 
Japanese banks and foreign banks) has gradually reduced.   
   Recently it is estimated that as a result of capital injection there is now unrealized gain of 
about one trillion yen in stocks held by the government, thanks to the increase in stock prices. 
This suggests the possibility of avoidance of the taxpayers’ burden concerning the funds using 
for capital injection.   K. Ikeo, Y. Goto / Public Policy Review 105 
Table 2: Situation of Each Accounts of Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan 
Trillion Yen 
  Spent on  Funding             
      FY1999 FY2000 FY2001 FY2002  FY2003  FY2004 
Ceiling  2 4 6 13  19  20.14 
Fiscal Funding 
(Initial Budget） - 4 6 13  19  19 
General Account  Payment of insurance 
claims, financial assitance, 
purchase of asset, capital 
subscription, loan, etc. 
(Actual use)  (1.31) (2.46) (3.12) (3.92)  (5.31)  n.a. 
Ceiling  10 10 10 6.5  -  - 
Fiscal Funding 
(Initial Budget） 17 23 23 19.5  -  - 
（Special Operations 
Account） 
Special financial assistance, 
asset purchase, loss 
compensation for 
contracted banks, etc. 
(Actual use)  (3.57) (3.49) (3.37) (3.09)  -  n.a. 
Ceiling  - - 15 15  15  17 
Fiscal Funding 




financial assistance, etc. 
(Actual use)  - - (0) (0)  (1.96)  n.a. 
Ceiling  18 18 10 12  15  15.2 
Fiscal Funding 
(Initial Budget） 18 18 10 12  15  14 
Financial 
Reconstruction Accout 
Asset purchase, loans to 
contracted banks for 
subscribing shares, etc. 
(Actual use)  (3.92) (5.12) (5.27) (5.66)  (4.66)  n.a. 
Ceiling  25 25 16 10.5  13.02  12.66 
Fiscal Funding 
(Initial Budget） 25 25 16 10.5  6.9  6 
Early Strengthening 
Accout 
Loans to contracted banks 
for subscribing shares, etc.
(Actual use)  (8.04) (8.10) (8.22) (8.20)  (7.93)  n.a. 
Ceiling  - - - -  1  1 
Fiscal Funding 




Loans to contracted banks 
for subscribing shares, loss 
compensation for 
contracted banks, etc. 
(Actual use)  - - - -  (0.01)  n.a. 
Ceiling  - - - -  0.15  0.15 
Fiscal Funding 




Subscription of equity of 
the Industrial 
Revitalization Corp. etc. 
(Actual use)  - - - -  (0)  n.a. 
Total      Ceiling  55 57 57 57  63.17  66.15 
        Fiscal Funding 
(Initial Budget） 60 70 70 70  57.05  57.15 
        (Actual use)  (16.85) (19.18) (19.98) (20.87)  (19.88)  n.a. 
Note1: "Fiscal funding" consists of government-guarantee and government bond granted. 
Note2: "Actual use" is actual financed amount against the ceiling. 
Source: Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan, Annual Report of each year 
 
 106  K. Ikeo, Y. Goto / Public Policy Review 








Capital Injection  12.4 2.2 10.2 
  Early Strengthening Law  8.6 1.0 7.6 
  Financial Function Stabilization Law  1.8 1.1 0.7 
  Deposit Insurance Law  2.0 0.0 2.0 
  Financial Reorganization Promotion Law 0.006 0.0 0.006 
Monetary Grant  13.8 0.0 13.8 
（total with deposit insurance premiums）  (18.6) 0.0 (18.6) 
Purchase of Assets  9.6 5.0 4.6 
Total  35.8  7.2  28.6 
（Locked-in Losses）  (10.4) 
Source: Web site of Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan, etc. 
 
Figure 1  Japan Premium 
 
Note: Japan premium is calculated by “interest rate (3 month) quoted by Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi - 
interest rate quoted by Barclays Bank in the Eurodollar market (London)”. 
Source: Bank of Japan, Monthly Report of Recent Economic and Financial Developments, etc. 
 
Collapse of Hokkaido Takushoku Bank 
and Yamaichi Securities（Nov. 97） 
Capital injection of 1.8 trillion yen 
to 21 major banks（Mar. 98） 
Collapse of LTCB（Oct. 98） 
and NCB (Dec. 98）
Introduction of zero interest 
rate policy (Feb. 99） 
Capital injection of 7.5 trillion yen 
to 15 major banks（Mar. 99） 
Ruling party announced 
postponement of the 
introduction of the payoff 
system（Dec. 99）
Introduction of quantitative 
easing policy（Mar. 2001）   K. Ikeo, Y. Goto / Public Policy Review 107 
III.2.    Support to Cash Flows by Government Financial Institutions 
 
   Throughout the 1990s government financial institutions actively gave support to corporate 
cash flows. Such support was an important part of measures in successive policy packages for 
stimulating the economy. Table 4 shows that frequent and various policies were implemented in 
the latter half of the 1990s when the financial system particularly lost some stability.     
   Their main target was small and medium-sized enterprises, while their contents changed 
depending on time. At the early stage they had quite a strong characteristic of impartial support 
to corporate cash flows, such as through a reduction of interest payments and an extension of 
loan facilities in September 1995. But after 2000, in more cases public support came to require 
restructuring of the financial and corporate sectors due to bankruptcies of financial institutions 
or reconstructions of concerned companies.
5. Hereafter we should not avoid to objectively assess 
the magnitude of benefits and cost of such financial support by government financial 
institutions when we discuss reform of government financial institutions. 
 









1990 91 92 93  94 95 96 97
Domestic Banks  Development Bank of Japan 
National Life Finance Cooperation 
Japan Finance Corporation for Small and Medium Enterprises 





                                                                            
5  The paper by Fujiwara in this issue investigates whether the activity of government financial institutions 
allowed enterprises that should in fact leave the market to survive (bringing the soft budget problem). 108  K. Ikeo, Y. Goto / Public Policy Review 
Table 4: Major Supporting Measures for Private Companies’ Finance after mid-1900s 
95 4  Emergency 
Economic 
Measures 
Support to SMEs’ finance Capital injection to government financial institutions 
which deal with loan for SMEs in response to yen 
appreciation (70.3 billion yen). Setting up new 
low-interest loan by NFC and JASME, and special 
treatment of small business credit insurance which doubles 
insurance limit. Extension of treating period of emergency 
management support loan and special measures of 
employment adjustment subsidy 
  9  Economic 
Measures 
Reduction or moratorium 
on interest payment by 
government financial 
institutions 
One-year reduction or moratorium on interest payment of 
SMEs which were lent by government financial institutions 
(JASME, etc.) during high-interest rate period 
      Support to working 
capital 
Expansion of support to working capital by government 
financial institutions, etc. 
      Expansion of credit 
guarantee 
Raise the insurance limit of new business development 
insurance, non-collateral insurance of small business credit 
insurance, etc. 
      Measures for small-sized 
enterprises 
Expand loan system relating to funds for improving 
management of small-sized enterprises (Maru-kei loan) 
and credit guarantee system 
      Diversification of SMEs’ 
finance 
Set up direct finance system though prefectures’ 
foundations, etc., utilizing advancement loan of Japan 
Small Business Corporation. Expand loan system relating 
to new business, etc. 
      Measures for agriculture, 
forestry and fishery 
Smoothing finance such as expansion of reduced-rate loan, 
etc. 
97  11  Emergency 
Economic 
Measures 
Expansion of loan facility 
of government financial 
institutions 
(improvement of loan 
system for SMEs) 
Set up separate loan facility of amount of 210 million yen 
by government financial institutions (additional loan 
against ordinary one by National Finance Corporation, etc. 
to SMEs whose finance are not smooth because of business 
slump of creditor banks) 
      Expansion of credit 
guarantee 
Include additionally 26 industries among those which can 
benefit from doubling credit guarantee corporations’ 
guarantee and expand non-collateral and non-guarantee 
loan facility 
98 4  Expand target of financial measures for SMEs: review 
definition of retail, wholesale, and service industry and 
raise the upper limit of paid-up capital 




Measures  Set up new loan facility of government financial 
institutions for SMEs’ finance and inject additional capital 
for it 
      New loan facility of government financial institutions for 
supporting business development of SMEs 
      Expand loan size and extend payment period of “Maru-kei” 
loan 
      Build up reserve fund of Small Business Credit Insurance 
Corporation and subsidy for Credit Guarantee 
Corporations fund 
     
Financial measures for 
SMEs, etc. 
Request local governments to expand loan facility 
additionally by 50 billion yen, strengthening managerial 
foundation of credit guarantee corporations 
      Financial measures for 
medium-sized 
enterprises, etc. 
Strengthen measures by government financial institutions 
such as establishment of “Guarantee System for Dealing 
with Changes in the Financial Environment”, etc. 




Examine promoting measures for issuance of corporate 
bond such as credit guarantee to SMEs’ corporate bonds, 
etc. 
      Expand guarantee fund of ISIF (Industrial Structure 
Improvement Fund), etc. 
     
Improvement of 
environment for finance 
by ventures, etc.  Support to ventures by government financial institutions 
(underwriting corporate bonds of ventures, etc.)   K. Ikeo, Y. Goto / Public Policy Review 109 








Expansion of Guarantee 
System (Introduction of 
Special Guarantee) 
(i) expansion of credit insurance limit (establishment of 
separate facility of ordinary insurance:200million yen, and 
non-collateral insurance:50 million yen <total amount: 250 
million yen>), (ii) reduction of credit insurance premium, 
(iii) easing requirements for insurance 
  11  Measures to alleviate the 
credit crunch 
Expand loan system (introduction of agency loan, diverting 
funds loan, etc.), strengthen credit guarantee system and 
utilize non-real estate collateral in government financial 
institutions’ lending 
      Utilize government financial institutions’ function of 
long-term working capital loan and corporate bonds 
redemption funds loan 




  New credit guarantee system for medium-sized enterprises 
by credit guarantee corporations 
        Reduction or moratorium on interest payments and 
utilization of credit guarantee in lending to SMEs by 
Hokkaido-Tohoku Development Finance Public 
Corporation 
99 11  Provide credit guarantee to private placed bond issued by 
SMEs which satisfy certain requirements 
    Expansion of capital injection by public institutions to 
venture funds 






Set up a system under which JASME underwrites warrant 
bonds issued by SMEs 
      Utilize intellectual property rights-collateral loan of DBJ, 
etc. 
      Set up non-interest-bearing loan for equipment funds and 
lease system for entrepreneur and small-sized enterprises, 
etc. 
      Expand start-up cost support loan by National Finance 
Corporation 
      Extend special measure of “Maru-kei” loan system such as 
start-up companies procure funds loan, etc. 
     
Facilitating and 
diversifying access to 
sources of financing by 
increasing the modalities 




Expand financial support to female and elder entrepreneurs 
      Extension (1 year) and expansion (10 trillion yen) of 
modalities of the special guarantees scheme 
     
Facilitating appropriate 
response to dramatic 
changes in the financial 
and economic 
environment 
Extend government financial institutions’ loan system and 
reduction or moratorium on interest payments for small 
and medium sized entrepreneurs and agriculture forestry 
and fishery persons 
00 10  Expand the general credit guarantee system by raising the 
upper limit on uncollateralized credit guarantees from 50 
million yen to 80 million yen 
    Expand the range of application of special credit 
guarantees to protect small and medium sized enterprises 
from obstacles to stable management arising from the 
bankruptcies of trading partners, or of trading partners' 
financial institution 
    Prepare a similar loan system of government financial 
institutions for SMEs and fulfill the system and 
implementation about collateral claims, etc. 






t toward the 
Rebirth of 
Japan 
Financing measures for 
small and medium 
enterprise 
Extension of reduction or moratorium by government 
financial institutions, etc. on interest payments by small 
and medium sized entrepreneurs and agriculture forestry 
and fishery persons 
01  4  Emergency 
Economic 
Package 
Smooth DIP finance, etc.  Utilize DBJ’s loan system (business rehabilitation loan 
system) relating to DIP finance in Civil Rehabilitation Law 
and Corporate Rehabilitation Law 110  K. Ikeo, Y. Goto / Public Policy Review 
  10  Safety-net for SMEs  Establish a new credit guarantee system for promoting loan 
collateralized by trade receivables 




  Fortify special small-amount insurance system for smooth 
finance by small entrepreneurs 
        Improve the system and implementation of safety-net 
guarantee by credit guarantee corporations and safety-net 
loans by government financial institutions 
        Establish a system in which government financial 
institutions for SMEs lend in cooperation with private 
financial institutions for DIP finance 
      Fortify a guarantee system by credit guarantee 
corporations for founding entrepreneurs (guarantee system 
relating to creating new business) 
     
support to the 
establishment and 
business innovation 
Smooth finance for innovations: review of requirements for 
guarantee for privately-placed bonds by SMEs and loans by 
government financial institutions to firms allowed to 
applying Law on Supporting Business Innovation of Small 
and Medium Enterprises 
      Expand the program of construction company’s debt 
guarantees as a safety net for subcontractors 
     
Structural reform of 
business confronting 
environmental change 
Strengthen the financial basis of agriculture credit 
guarantee fund association of each prefecture, etc. 
      Corporate restructuring  Request the DBJ and RCC to set up and/or participate in 
funds for restructuring companies 




Expansion of safety-net 
loans and guarantee 
Ease the certification standards of safety-net guarantee. 
Expand and reinforce safety-net lending by extending the 
eligibility of borrowers and by creating a new lending 
facility in the Shoko Chukin Bank featuring unsecured 
loans of up to 30 million yen for small- and medium-sized 
enterprises experiencing funding difficulties 
      Actively utilizing the 
guarantee system of loan 
collateralized by trade 
receivables 
Government ministries and agencies shall cooperate to 
promptly eliminate restrictive contract clauses prohibiting 
the transfers of receivable accounts owed by the 
government and by major corporations 
      Greater flexibility in 
revising repayment terms 
under special guarantees 
Greater flexibility shall be added in revising repayment 
terms under special guarantees 
  10  Revitalization of industry 
and enterprises as quickly 
as possible 
Upgrade the system of lending to the corporation 
reconstruction fund, and expand the loans system for third 
party businesses acquiring or inheriting the assets of 
enterprises undergoing reconstruction will be implemented 
    Support to formations and 
start-ups of new business 
Create an uncollateraled loan system for small and medium 
businesses opening new business fields (Shoko Chukin 
Bank) 
    Raise the maximum limits under the "credit crunch 
uncollateralized financing system." (Shoko Chukin Bank) 
    Include in the DIP finance target group those SMEs being 
restructured under the private-sector adjustment 
guidelines (Japan Finance Corporation for Small Business, 
Shoko Chukin Bank and Okinawa Finance Corporation) 




Establish a system to provide finance to viable SME's 
whose credits have been transferred to the Resolution and 
Collection Corporation (RCC) (Japan Finance Corporation 
for Small Business, Shoko Chukin Bank and Okinawa 
Finance Corporation) 
    Provide additional safety net guarantees for new target 
group 














system  Establish a business recovery guarantee system (DIP 
guarantee) for SME's that have initiated legal 
reconstruction procedures and have been issued an 
approved recovery plan   K. Ikeo, Y. Goto / Public Policy Review 111 
02 12  Introduce lending programs, such as safety-net loans and 
DIP financing, for the operators of SMEs who undertake 
the rebuilding of their businesses 




Establish a new business start-up financing system for the 
purpose of supporting the opening of new operations by 
women and by workers who are middle-aged and older as 
well as the launching of new businesses that utilize IT 




Expand safety net guarantees 
     
smoothing 
provision of 









Establish a guarantee system that will assist with the 
management of funds 
      provision of funds to the 
operators of small and 
mid-sized construction 
firms etc. 
Expand the program of debt guarantees as a safety net for 
subcontractors 
 
III.3.  Credit  Guarantee 
 
      Credit guarantee can be considered as one tool of in the safety net of corporate finance. The 
“Special Credit Guarantee” of 1998 is conspicuous among recent policies. This credit guarantee 
system (credit guarantee scheme for financial stability of small- and medium-sized enterprises) 
was introduced in 1998 when the fear of tight financial conditions for such enterprises emerged 
due to the instability of the financial system.   
   The necessary conditions for use of this guarantee system were much looser than the 
previous system. Applications for guarantee were submitted via financial institutions but in the 
previous system credit guarantee corporations and financial institutions were doubly screened. 
On the other hand there was almost no assessment for offering guarantees in the new scheme 
unless the company concerned was in the particular situation where banks had suspended 
business with it, for example. In addition the proportion of the guarantee of the new scheme was 
100%, unlike the previous scheme which guaranteed only some portion. (Figure 3) 
   However, payment in subrogation by credit guarantee corporations increased temporarily 
because irrecoverable loans increased as more credit guarantees were offered. This resulted in 
losses of hundreds of billions of yen for the credit insurance programs of Japan Finance 
Corporation for Small and Medium Enterprises (JASME), which offers reinsurance to each local 
credit guarantee corporation. This loss was finally covered with capital put in by the central 
government (see Figures 4 and 5).   
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      Besides these direct safety nets, a policy to prevent financial crisis through monetary easing 
was widely implemented. The Bank of Japan introduced a zero interest rate policy in February 
1999. After ending this policy, BoJ has implemented a quantitative easing policy since March 
2001. The target of this policy is summed-up amount of current account balances of financial 
institutions at the Bank of Japan, replacing an interest rate that cannot be reduced below zero 
percent. At first the target level was set at 5 trillion yen which exceeded the required reserve by 
one trillion yen, while it is at 30-35 trillion yen now in the summer of 2005.   
   Seemingly this quantitative easing policy has significantly contributed to an orderly 
financial system, although its effect as an economic stimulus policy is not clear. Anyway as a 
result of the policy, the Bank’s asset outstanding is around 150 trillion yen, which means BoJ has 
become the largest central bank in the world and has contributed to the expansion in the share 
of public financial services. 
 
IV.  Public  Financial  Intermediation 
 
   As for aspect (ii) “by the government,” or public financial intermediation, the Fiscal 
Investment and Loan Program (FILP) in the narrow sense has been drastically streamlined in 
recent years owing to the FILP reform implemented in FY2001. For example the FILP plan for 
special corporations is now reduced to less than 12 trillion yen, one third of its peak. But the 
share of public financial institutions (which include BoJ) in total assets held by all financial 
institutions is still high, as shown by Figure 6. One reason is that the balance sheet of BoJ has 
become larger under its quantitative easing policy, as mentioned earlier.   
 




































Outstanding assets of the public financial corporations in accounts classified by institutional sectors / 
outstanding assets of financial corporations in SNA 114  K. Ikeo, Y. Goto / Public Policy Review 
   The current situation of the debtor-creditor relationship of each sector in Japan is 
summarized in Figure 7. Liabilities (including equities) outstanding for the corporate sector 
amounts to 519 trillion yen, while that of government sector is 646 trillion yen, which means the 
latter figure surpasses the former. This fact endorses the argument pointed by (iii) that the 
current financial system is “for the government.” Such tendency is clearer when we see the 
movement of flow (differences in stock) in recent years. The monetary flow tends to go “towards 
the public from private.” Therefore some argue that this trend should be reversed and we must 
reverse the direction of monetary flow from public towards private. 
   In this context, at the same time we see some arguments that we should reform 
organizations relating to public financial intermediation in order to reverse the monetary flow. 
However, this sort of argument is considered as a confusion of (ii)’s problem with (iii)’s problem. 
Though both (ii) and (iii) have respective problems, there is no relation in which correcting (ii) 
leads to an automatic improvement in (iii)’s problem. In short, even if we realize reducing the 
share of public financial intermediation, it is quite possible that funds still continue to flow into 
the public purse via private financial intermediate system or market. Actually in these years 
postal savings and postal insurance have decreased a little, but private financial institutions’ 
holding of government bonds has increased greatly.   
      In other words, to correct the tendency of (iii) it is essential to reduce financial demand in 
fiscal expenditure itself. As far as fiscal demand itself remains without restructuring, there 
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remains a need for the public to finance fiscal expenditure. If it becomes difficult to utilize the 
public financial intermediate system for such financing, it means that private financial 
intermediation or market channels may be used. There cannot be the case in which government 
sector whose creditworthiness must be the highest, becomes unable to borrow. Thus it is 
essential to remove the need for borrowing.   
      We should, however, emphasize that the above is equivalent to the argument that we do not 
have to correct (ii)’s tendency. It should be reformed from the viewpoint of its own problem, not 
as an improvement for (iii). Here we want to confirm that it is important not to misunderstand 
the objective of reform. We can say it is more essential than usual to grasp precisely where the 
problem is, now that discussion on what policy-based financial institutions should be like is 
being planned again, accompanied by postal privatization.   
      Then how should we understand (ii)’s problem. Of course policy-based financial institutions 
also exist other than in Japan. Focusing on institutions owned by governments, we see their 
existence right across the world. Regarding such policy-based financial institutions, there are 
major four viewpoints.
6.  
     The first is called the “social view.” This view emphasizes the imperfections of the market, 
insisting on the significance of policy-based finance as a complement to “market failure” in the 
financial field. The second is called the “development view.” It argues that intervention by the 
government is effective for resolving problems in the development stage. In this stage, since the 
market system itself is not well developed, it might be difficult to discuss market failure in a 
narrow sense while we cannot expect the full functioning of the market. Moreover, in such stage, 
externality of investment relating to provision of a social infrastructure is prone to be large and 
there is a strong tendency that social benefit substantially exceeds (private) benefit which 
investors themselves can enjoy (i.e. there often occurs market failure). That is why investment 
might be too little if we only depend on the private sector’s decisions, and we should recognize 
the significance of promoting investment using policy-based finance.   
   While these arguments are positive to policy-based finance, the third, the “political view,” 
and the fourth, the “agency view,” are both negative. The political view considers policy-based 
financial institutions as an instrument for realizing politicians’ own intentions. According to 
this view, since politicians’ intentions is usually to get wider political support for themselves, 
policy-based finance is apt to be utilized for the purpose of giving favorable treatment to the 
industry or region relevant to their own political power base. Thus the political view argues 
there are only a few cases in which such measures to grant some favor are reasonable in the 
economic sense. On the other hand the agency view insists on the necessity for valid 
consideration of the possibility of “government failure” in addition to market failure. In short, 
even if there are market failures, we must not ignore the existence of agency costs accompanied 
                                                                            
6 Levy-Yeyati, Eduardo, Micco, Alejandro and Pnizza, Ugo G., “State-Owned Banks: Do They Promote or 
Depress Financial Development and Economic Growth?” 2004, http://ssrn.com/abstract=629384 116  K. Ikeo, Y. Goto / Public Policy Review 
by bureaucracy. Taking account of this, the net benefit of government intervention may not 
necessarily be positive.   
   Each view has respective grounds to some extent. Perhaps not a few people recognize the 
validity of the development view, because policy-based finance originally has a strong 
relationship with the concept of development, as symbolized by the fact that in Japan the 
representative policy-based financial institution is the Development Bank of Japan (even after 
changing its Japanese name from “Nihon Kaihatsu Ginkou” to “Nihon Seisaku Toushi Ginkou,” its 
English name remains the same as before). Even if the development view is right, however, the 
present Japanese economy is not in the stage of development, there the current situation cannot 
be justified.   
      Meanwhile the social view tries to seek the validity of policy-based finance in the possibility 
of failure even in a developed economy. Actually we cannot deny there often are market failures. 
But as emphasized by the agency view, governments also often fail. Markets do not fail without 
reason. They fail when there is some cause, such as restricted information and so on. Even the 
government cannot always be free from such causes. Considering these conditions, the case in 
which government intervention effectively complements market failure is supposedly quite 
limited. At the same time it seems to be true that we cannot completely deny such tendency as 
insisted by political view in Japan.   
   The above line of thought suggests the scale of policy-based finance justified in current 
Japanese economy is extremely limited. That is to say, the government financial institutions that 
exist now should reduce or abolish their operations, or should be reviewed in consideration of 
privatization. Even in the case when the role of such an institution is finished, if there remains a 
beneficial resource or other accumulation, it is desirable to utilize such an institution again by 
privatization. On the other hand, as for the part left as a government financial institution, it is 
important to avoid softening budget constraints by clearly defining the role (mission) and 
establishing a proper governance structure as well as posing rigid accounting and accountability 
on the content of fiscal support from government.     
   There is already certain progress in the review of policy-based financial institutions from 
this viewpoint. As for all FILP agencies, including policy-based financial institutions (but 
excluding local government), they nowadays make financial statements based on accounting 
standards for private corporations and are participated by audit by certified public accountants 
etc. In addition, “policy cost analysis”
7 was introduced in FY1999 and now it is promoted to 
expand the range of applications and improve analysis techniques. But of course a review on the 
                                                                            
7  “Policy cost analysis is used in trial calculations of the following under certain assumptions (interest 
rate, operation scale, and prospect of utilization), based on the estimation about some factors in the 
future including cash flows about projects of FILP agencies utilizing FILP system: total national cost 
(taxpayers’ burden = policy cost), i.e. (i) future subsidies supplied by central government, and (ii) total 
amount (discounted present value) of effect for reducing interest payments (opportunity cost) by capital 
already introduced.” Cited from Total Review on FILP Reform by FILP Sub-committee of Fiscal System 
Council, December 10th, 2004.   K. Ikeo, Y. Goto / Public Policy Review 117 
validity of operations and so forth should be done at any time, and reform is still needed. 
   Therefore it is expected by current discussions on the review of policy-based financial 
institutions that the viewpoint above will achieve more success. Now, as for postal privatization, 
since it is a topic strongly related to public debt management, we will discuss it in a section 
below after reviewing the current situation of public debt and fiscal deficit. 
 
V.    Current Situation of Public Debt and Fiscal Deficit 
 
      Turning our eyes to the last aspect of (iii) “for the government”, the perspective for trimming 
the fiscal deficit is still far from certain and the public debt amount already very high. But it 
should be noted that the whole picture of public debt might not be precisely understood by the 
majority since total unified management of public debt is not completely realized in Japan. For 
example, although government bonds (JGB) are often mentioned as representative of public debt, 
Japanese public debt is not composed solely of JGBs.   
      Firstly, we should review an outline of Japanese public debt in view of covered objects and 
outstanding balance. A respective outline of each type of public debt is explained in the 
Appendix at the end of this paper, as it includes some detailed topics. As for contents in relation 
to institutions or design, they are as of the end of March 2005. Since the Debt Management 
Report 2004 edited by the Financial Bureau of Japanese Ministry of Finance also provides a 
proper explanations about them, refer to the report when needed.     
     Table 5 focuses on the main points. Here we can see a general view of the debt amount for 
each unit: (a) central government, (b) local government, and (c) government-affiliated 
organizations. As for the change over time , both amount outstanding and the GDP ratio of all 
debts—except that of Japan Post—continue to expand, as shown in Figure 8.   
      Although the public debt outstanding is so extremely high, there appears little sense of crisis 
among people in general, and the problem has not come to the surface. Of course this is because 
the debt service burden is very light thanks to low interest rates. Since the mid-1990s, 
expansion of the public debt and decline in long-term interest rates under the proceeding 
monetary easing policy have compensated for each other. Such circumstances have realized 
almost unchanged interest expenses. Therefore in spite of a larger public debt, the sense of 
burden has not grown. Once interest rates begin to rise, however, the situation might change 
drastically.  
   The  level  of  long-term interest rates cannot be fully controlled by monetary policy alone. It 
is strongly affected by the expectations of market participants concerning the future economic 
situation. That is why in order to prevent a surge in long-term interest rates it is not sufficient 
only to continue monetary easing, but it is necessary to establish some prospect for an 
improvement in the fiscal balance. Even without immediate improvement, there is big difference 
whether we have such prospect or not. 118  K. Ikeo, Y. Goto / Public Policy Review 
Table 5: Outstanding of Japanese Public Debt (as of end-FY2003) 
(Trillion Yen) 
Government Bond  556 
  Ordinary Government Bond  457 
   Construction  Bond  226 
   Special  Deficit-Financing Bond  211 
  Fiscal Investment and Loan Program Bond  92 
  Other Government Bond (Government Bond Granted, 
etc.)  8 
Borrowing  61 
Financing Bill  86 
Central 
Government 
Total  703 
Central Govt.  (Government Guarantee・・・as contingent liability）  (58) 
Local Bond  199 
 Ordinary  Account  Bond  139 
Local  
Government 
  Local Public Corporations Securities  61 
Postal Savings  227 
Postal Insurance  188 
Japan 
Post 
Total  415 
Case1: Only reserve is recognized as liability and 
appropriated as deposit of public pension.  158 
Case2: Only reserves and Government subsidies are to be 
recognized as liabilities.  295 
Public Pension 
（Central Govt.） 
Case3: The present value of benefits corresponding to the 
past period is to be recognized as liabilities.  802 
Government Guaranteed Bond and Borrowing  58 
FILP Agency Bond  7 
Special Corporation
etc. 
Total  65 
Note 1: Postal saving is the outstanding amount of postal savings. Postal Insurance is the sum 
of life insurance and annuity policies in force. 
Note 2: Only the figure for public pensions is trial calculation as of end-FY2001. How to 
divide this into the three cases and concretely calculate it depends on “The Japanese 
Government Balance Sheet (Primary Trial)” by Ministry of Finance. 
Note 3: The figure for FILP-Agency bond is the accumulated value of the issued amount. 
   K. Ikeo, Y. Goto / Public Policy Review 119 


































Note1: Local government debt is the sum of ordinary account bond, local public corporations securities, 
and local government’s share of special account for grants of allocation tax and transferred tax. 
Note2: Borrowing excludes that of special account relating to postal services.   
Note3: Japan Post’s debt is the sum of postal savings outstanding and reserve for postal insurance.   
Note4: Public pension is the sum of reserve of employee pension insurance and national pension insurance.   
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      Still, the prospect for achieving a surplus in the primary balance (basic fiscal balance) is not 
certain. The current primary balance is expected to improve minus 5.4% to minus 4.4% (GDP 
ratio for central and local government: SNA basis). But this is only because of cyclical recovery 
(conversely economic recovery alone also brings about such a small improvement) and it is not 
considered that this is a steady improvement in the structural primary balance. 
   As a trial, Figure 9 indicates a breakdown of fiscal deficit regarding general account into 
structural and cyclical parts. Estimations may vary depending on the estimated value of the 
elasticity of taxes to national income. For instance, it is possible that corporate tax will increase   
 
Table 6: Prospects for Primary Balance 
Fiscal Year 2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
A. General Account  ▲19.6 ▲19.0  ▲20.5 ▲20.2 ▲22.4 -  - 
B. Central Govt.  ▲5.2% ▲4.8%  ▲4.5% ▲3.8% ▲3.2% ▲2.8%  ▲2.3% 
 Local  Govt.  ▲0.1% 0.4%  0.5% 0.6% 0.6% 0.7%  0.8% 
 Total  ▲5.4% ▲4.4%  ▲4.0% ▲3.1% ▲2.7% ▲2.1%  ▲1.5% 
Note: A is an estimate by the Ministry of Finance (case of figure in a natural manner). Trillion yen 
  B is from “Mid-Term Perspectives for Structural Reform and Economic and Fiscal Management 
-FY2004 Revision” (which considers the efforts for fiscal improvement). Ratio to nominal GDP. Only 
the figure for FY2003 is from the FY2003 Revision. 
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drastically with today’s economic recovery of, taking into account that during the period in the 
table there were many companies that did not pay corporate taxes owing to falling into the red 
through appropriating many special losses etc. Furthermore at the same time there may be a 
remarkable tendency of decline in the fiscal deficit. But even if such situation is realized, we 
should see it as a result of temporary factors and should continue efforts for structural 
improvement.    
      Actually the prospect by Japanese Cabinet Office that fiscal balance turns to surplus in the 
early 2010s includes efforts for improving the fiscal balance (and a recovery in the economic 
growth rate) beforehand. Realization of such a vision depends also on the political situation etc. 
hereafter. Further, the ratio of outstanding debt to GDP does not stop diverging only through an 
equilibrium of fiscal balance, considering the possibility of higher nominal interest rates than 
nominal growth rates.   






≤ − × ) (  
Here, B indicates public bonds outstanding, P is the primary balance, Y is GDP, r is the nominal 
interest rate, and g is the nominal growth rate, respectively. This means that if the nominal 
interest rate is lower than the nominal growth rate, a primary balance of more than zero satisfies 
the condition, but if not, even such primary balance is not necessarily enough. Suppose nominal 
interest rate – nominal growth rate = 2%, public bonds outstanding/ GDP = 2, around 4% of 
surplus of primary balance to GDP is necessary for stopping divergence (2×2 = 4). 
 
VI.    Public Debt Management and Privatization of Postal Services 
 
   Owing to the fiscal situation described above, the management of Japanese public debt, 
which is already huge and still is expanding should be an important subject. If we fail, it is 
inevitable that we will experience tremendous turbulence, not only in the financial system but 
also in the whole Japanese economy. While there can be some important points about which 
management policy of public debt we should adopt, here we limit discussions to those relating 
to matters regarding postal privatization, now being promoted.     
      Among the public debts, the possession structure of JGBs in Japan is pointed out as having 
remarkable feature compared with the US etc. One is that most JGBs are purchased in the 
domestic market and are held mainly by residents, which means non-residents have only a small 
percentage. In recent years the ratio of JGB held by the foreign sector is only around 4%. The 
other feature is that the proportion of direct holdings by households is small and a lot of JGBs 
are indirectly held by way of financial institutions. 
   The former is simply a fact that cannot be denied, but the latter can be understood in 
different ways depending on the position of postal savings (especially fixed-amount postal 122  K. Ikeo, Y. Goto / Public Policy Review 
savings). Postal savings have been a liability for Japan Post since 2003, but it was a debt of one 
account of the Japanese central government called the postal savings special account before that. 
In addition, the designed characteristic of fixed-amount postal saving is very close to that of the 
JGB for individual investors that the Japanese Ministry of Finance began to issue by itself, and 
also very similar to the savings bonds issued for individual household in the United States.   
   In short, according to the vertical division which is one feature of Japanese governmental 
organization’s structure, authorities for owing debt are not unified and thus the debts issued by 
the former Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications was not sufficiently recognized as a 
government bond. The debts issued by the Ministry of Finance alone have been considered as a 
central government bond. If the authority to owe liabilities was unified, however, postal savings 
(at least fixed-amount postal savings) are naturally viewed as JGB for individual investors.     
   Actually the reason why the proportion of individual investors’ holdings of JGB is small is 
due to the existence of fixed-amount postal savings, which is a close substitute. If we regard 
fixed amount postal savings as a substantial government bond for individual investors, the ratio 
of households’ holdings of JGB is not low at all. In terms of its function, since most of the assets 
held by postal savings are public debt (Table 7), postal savings can be seen as a kind of public 
debt transformed into a form whose portion is small and liquidity is high for individual investors 
to readily hold. 
      Until very recently the Ministry of Finance itself has not issued government bonds designed 
for individuals to hold easily, while postal saving’s function of asset transformation has been 
utilized. In the sense above, fixed-amount postal savings is considered as no other than a kind of 
government bond for individual investors in terms of its function. This implies that 
privatization of postal services has a close relationship with public debt management problem. 
That is, it should be clear in postal privatization whether we may expect privatized institutions 
to supply an asset transformation function as before, and if not, what kind of substitute 
mechanism should be prepared with regard to holding the public debt.   
    Postal savings and postal insurance formerly functioned as financing device for FILP, but now 
they are concerned with the overall finance of fiscal deficit of the Japanese government, not 
limited to FILP (as mentioned previously the size of FILP in the narrow sense has been 
significantly reduced). A simplified picture of the current situation is shown in Figure 10.     
      Here the outstanding of public debt of the Japanese government is equal to the accumulated 
value of fiscal deficit till now (plus asset value, in reality). Japan Post possesses one part of that 
public debt (the part marked JGB I in the figure) and transforms it into fixed-amount postal 
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Table 7: Asset Portfolio of Postal Savings 
(As of end-March 2004) 
     
Balance of Assets 
（billion yen） 
proportion of total 
（％） 
Deposits with Fiscal Loan Fund  112720.0 49.57 
Securities          105896.4 46.57 
   Government  Bonds  86009.1 37.82 
    Local  Government  Bonds     9483.4 4.17 
   Corporate  Bonds  6902.6 3.04 
        Public Corporate Bonds, etc.  3837.0 1.69 
   Foreign  Bond  3501.1 1.54 
Money Held in Trusts  3776.0 1.66 
Loans          2786.1 1.23 
   to  Local  Governments  2041.1 0.90 
   to  Depositors,  etc.  576.0 0.25 
   to  Postal  Services  169.0 0.07 
Deposits, etc.      2219.5 0.98 
Total      227398.2 100.00 
      
Total of Public Debt  214090.6 94.15 
Source: “Postal Services in Japan 2004” 
 
Figure 10: Picture of Current Situation 
C e n t r a l   G o v e r n m e n t                                 J a p a n   P o s t  




Government Bond  Ⅱ      
（Government Bond I here includes deposits with Fiscal Loan Fund in a broad sense）   
 
   Therefore the part of JGB I must be reduced if we plan to decrease fixed-amount postal 
savings. In order to decrease JGB I, there is no way other than (a) reducing the accumulated 
fiscal deficit (plus holding asset value) and/or (b) increasing the part shown as JGB II. The 
former means attaining fiscal surplus or selling the government’s assets, while the latter is 
refinancing in different measure. In other words, the fund collected by postal savings and postal 
insurance are not reserved somewhere as cash, but most of it is lent to the Japanese government. 
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return to postal savings’ depositors.   
   In this sense, as for the issue— the flow of funds which were previously directed into the 
public sector (e.g. special corporations etc.) being reduced, which will make it possible for 
people’s savings to take part in leading the economy towards revitalization and for the 
government to improve fiscal situation,”
8 — probably postal privatization alone does not realize 
this, although the subject itself is urgent. Even if the Japanese government becomes unable to 
finance as easily as before, this does not mean there is less need for finance. As mentioned 
previously, (ii) “by the government,” and (iii) “for the government” should not be confused. They 
are related to each other but should be resolved as independent problems.  
   For f is c al  he al t h,  ta x  hi ke s  a nd s pe ndi ng  c uts  are  ce nt ral  and  there  should  be  big 
supplementation of logic for postal privatization to function as a mainspring. Moreover, even if 
the flow of fiscal demand is reduced, the problem of managing the public debt stock, which has 
mounted up, still remains. In order for postal savings and postal insurance to transfer their cash 
of 350 trillion yen to the private sector, the same amount of credit must be collected from the 
public sector ahead of this. Here the key point becomes whether the public sector can bear such 
a collection.     
   As  f or t hi s poi nt , how eve r, t he pos ta l pri vati z ati on bi ll s of this time prepare quite a long 
transition period. As for the existing account (except ordinary savings) provided government 
guarantee in postal savings and postal insurances, the account is planned to be succeeded by the 
Management Organization for Postal Savings and Postal Insurances, which will be established as 
an independent administrative institution, but its fund management is to be managed by the 
Postal Savings Bank and Postal Insurances Company. Under such management, the assets to be 
invested will be limited to public debt such as government bonds, etc. (this treatment is a kind 
of collateral). Thus as to existing account, asset transforming function continues to be a duty.  
   See mi ngl y  it  wi ll   ta ke   quite   l ong   t o  s hift   s a vi ng s  a nd  ins urance in the existing account to the 
new account. The maturity term of fixed-amount postal saving is ten years (actual average term 
is four or five years) and there is a commodity whose maturity is thirty years as for postal 
insurance. Moreover, taking account of the period necessary for postal savings bank and postal 
insurance company to obtain the skills to invest in assets other than public debt, probably the 
asset transforming function will, as before, be offered for around ten years. 
   T hus  t he  J a pa nese  g ove rnme nt  onl y ha s t o ma ke  ef fort s  t o c onstruct a substitute system 
regarding possession of the public debt during this transition period. This means that there is 
some time to spare, but using this time means there will be a delay of the same length to achieve 
the goal—“the flow of funds that were previously directed into the public sector will be shifted 
towards the private sector, which will make it possible for people’s savings to take part in leading 
the economy towards revitalization.”
9. Furthermore, if the substitute system for possession of 
                                                                            
8  Cited from Interim Report on Privatization of Postal Services published April 26, 2004. 
9 Cited  from  Basic Policies for Privatization of Postal Services published on September 10, 2004.   K. Ikeo, Y. Goto / Public Policy Review 125 
the public debt is substantially replacing postal savings and postal insurance with government 
bonds for individual investors, in consequence, the macroeconomic flow of funds does not 
change at all.     
   In the sense above we would just repeat that we cannot change the flow of funds “from 
public to private” without fiscal surplus or the sale of government assets. 
 
VII.  Conclusion 
 
   Let us review the saving-investment balance of Japan during the postwar period. First, 
during the early period, the household savings rate was high against a basic backdrop of 
population composition whose main part was the young generation. The household sector 
consistently generated surplus of funds (excess savings) which was around 10% of nominal GDP. 
On the other hand, as the corporate sector’s willingness to invest was exceedingly vigorous, its 
deficit of funds (excess investment) would sometimes exceed household sector’s surplus of 
funds.   
   The public sector was basically keeping a balanced budget and the extent of the deficit of 
funds was small. Thus as the momentum for expansion of the fund deficit of the corporate sector 
became so strong as to surpass the surplus of funds of household sector, current account deficit 
(surplus of funds of foreign sector) was brought about. Under the fixed exchange rate scheme of 
those days, the current deficit was compensated for by drawing down the foreign reserves of the 
government.   
   Then when foreign reserves began to decrease, monetary policy was usually tightened, 
intending to restrict firms’ investment and to promote current account surplus. In other words, 
the balance of payment constraints was the biggest factor interrupting further economic growth 
during this period. However in the latter half of the 1960s, as the international competitiveness 
of the Japanese economy increased, the tendency of the current account surplus became almost 
fixed under the fixed exchange rate of 360 yen per one US dollar, and it became necessary to 
consider the shortage of foreign reserves.     
   With such a saving-investment balance, the biggest mission of the financial system was to 
collect as much funds—which tended to be low—and to provide firms with the funds for 
investment. Financial system and mechanism of Japan was improved for performing this mission 
for about one hundred years after the Meiji Restoration. Only if some fund was financed one did 
not have difficulty to find how to spend it, because there existed enough investment 
opportunities till the former half of postwar period. 
   But since the 1970s the situation began to change dramatically. With the end of the 
high-growth period investment, opportunities became scarcer than before and the willingness of 
corporate sector to invest drastically declined. However, the household savings rate did not 
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balance of Japan. That is to say, since the household savings rate kept a high level in spite of the 
fall in the investment rate of companies, the saving-investment balance of Japan basically turned 
into a surplus fund.     
   During the 1970s, such underlying change was not easily recognized as it became confused 
with the influence of the oil crises etc. But in the 1980s, the change finally became broadly 
recognized and people began to use the expression “excesses money,” which had never existed 
before. At this time, the emphasis on the role to be taken by the Japanese financial system 
dramatically changed. Namely, it became more important to have expertise in investing than in 
financing. Without fully meeting such need, however, the banking sector in Japan expanded 
excess lending, which led to the outbreak of the bubble economy.     
   In terms of macroeconomic monetary balance, the surplus of funds of the domestic private 
sector should be absorbed by the financial deficit of the government sector (i.e. fiscal deficit) or 
the foreign sector (i.e. current account surplus of Japan). In fact, after around 1975 the 
government sector rapidly expanded its fiscal deficit, and the current account also tended to 
gain a large surplus in the 1980s when the effect of the oil shock disappeared.         
   This pattern of saving-investment balance has continued for these past25–30 years. But 
there is a possibility that the time is coming when the trend of saving-investment balance 
dramatically changes. That is, we are experiencing a drastic decline in the household savings 
rate against a background of an aging population and the surplus of funds in the domestic 
private sector is decreasing. If this tendency becomes fixed as a trend there remains less room 
for the government to maintain a large financial deficit. Without the financial surplus of the 
domestic private sector, the government’s fund deficit can only be compensated for by financial 
surplus of the foreign sector (i.e. current account deficit).     
   If the trend in saving-investment balance is changing in the direction as domestic private 
sector’s financial surplus declines, it becomes more necessary to maintain a healthy fiscal 
situation. Here, we can say a rise in the national burden rate itself accompanied by a healthier 
fiscal situation leads to a decrease in the financial surplus of the domestic private sector. What 
then is the essential role for the financial system in such a future?       
      Provided that the financial positions of both the household sector and the corporate sector 
reach balanced positions taking each sector as a whole, there should be less need for financial 
intermediation, such as by collecting funds from households and lending it to corporations. 
Rather financial intermediation that redistributes funds within the sector seemingly becomes 
more needed. This is because the total balance is getting closer to zero while variance inside 
sectors is expanding in reality.   
      The fact that the macroeconomic growth rate has declined does not mean every company or 
industry is growing only at low rate. In reality there are some companies and industries growing 
rapidly, but on the other hand some continues to decline. The sum total of them creates a low 
value of growth rate as a result. Thus such financial redistribution becomes more important as   K. Ikeo, Y. Goto / Public Policy Review 127 
collecting loans from decaying industries and companies whose potential growth is low and 
lending to industries and companies whose growth can be expected. Also within the household 
sector it is more necessary to coordinate the financial surplus and the deficit of the generations.   
   However, for this financial redistribution, a genuine capital market is indispensable, one 
that gathers information covering the whole economy and expresses this data through price 
announcements. Without such a firm capital market which works for information dissemination, 
it is impossible to redistribute funds properly among industries. Furthermore, to cope with the 
increase in variance among the generations, the existence of a capital market that enables 
diversified investment is effective.   
      For the establishment of a genuine capital market, building an institutional infrastructure is 
indispensable. Such establishment cannot be realized only by deregulation or liberalization. For 
getting information ex ante and ensuring execution ex post—which are essential for financial 
transactions, no one can avoid bearing cost in any case. In bilateral-style finance, concerned 
parties directly take on the burden of such costs through respective contracts. Meanwhile, in 
market-styled finance, getting information and ensuring execution should be supported by 
provision of “public goods” through an effective legal environment and information 
infrastructure. The cost for the provision of such public goods must be met collectively.       
   In this respect, the role of the government is important but it is different from traditional 
case. In short, it is now necessary to redefine the government’s role. This is not to try to 
“substitute markets,” but to shift to “preserving markets” by improvement and maintenance of 
the institutional infrastructure and a competition policy needed for the market mechanism to 
work. Specifically, we must maintain our efforts, such as by enacting the Financial Services Act.   
    In short, it should be expected that the situation like a financial system “of the government,” 
“by the government,” and “for the government” be terminated, and the relationship between the 
government and the financial system should be changed in the direction outlined above. 
 
Appendix:    Outline of Public Debt
10 
 
I)    JGB (Japanese Government Bonds)   
      JGBs are the core of Japanese public debt and consist of (i) construction bonds, (ii) special 
deficit-financing bonds (or simply, deficit-finance bonds), and (iii) fiscal loan bonds. Since they 
are all bonds whose characteristics are the same and which are issued by the central government, 
there is no difference in their treatment in the market. The differences are in the use of the 
financed funds. Construction bonds are for improving social capital, and special 
deficit-financing bonds are for the purpose of financing fiscal deficits, while outstanding value 
of these bonds  is at a level of between 200 and 250 trillion yen. Issue of fiscal loan bond 
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started during the opportunities of FILP reform in FY2001. Since the issuance reflects 
institutional reform (abolition of deposits of postal savings etc.), the increase in issuance does 
not necessarily mean an increase in net liability of the government sector, but its outstanding 
value is already close to around 100 trillion yen.     
   The outstanding value of construction bonds and deficit-financing bonds are rapidly 
expanding against a background of the recent severe fiscal situation. Particularly special 
deficit-financing bonds, which are issued for filling fiscal deficits, are rapidly increasing by an 
average of around 10% each year since the 1990s. 
 
II)  FB(Financing  Bills) 
      FB is a bond that the central government issues and whose maturity is short. Because of the 
restriction of cash use, it is distinguished from government bonds, but the market treats it as the 
same as a short-term government bond (i.e. treasury bond). Though its maturity is tentatively 
three months, it is actually refinanced. Thus there always is more than a certain level of 
outstanding as lying accumulation (since FY1990 at least around ten trillion yen). Because FBs 
reach maturity in a short term, there exists a tendency that interest payments might increase 
rapidly when market interest rates rise with monetary tightening by the BoJ.     
      The amount outstanding has been increasing rapidly since 1990s. This reflects solely foreign 
exchange intervention of selling yen and buying US dollars by the government (foreign exchange 
fund special account). The amount outstanding of FB as of end-FY2003 was 86 trillion yen and 
85 trillion yen was for that special account. 
 
III)  Government  Borrowing 
   Though Government borrowing is a debt of the central government, like the government 
bond, the accounts that finance funds are not usually the general account but ten special 
accounts as of end-FY2003. In 61 trillion yen of the total outstanding, a little less than 50 
trillion yen is for the special account for grants of allocation tax and transferred tax. Because 
maturities of a lot of government borrowings also are quite short (around six months), interest 
payments might grow drastically during the period of rising interest rates.             
   The amount outstanding is increasing, reflecting only the special account for grants of 
allocation tax and transferred tax. The amount outstanding for other special accounts remains at 
almost the same level. The sharp increase in borrowing by the special account for grants of 
allocation tax and transferred tax is against a backdrop of a shortage of local governments’ 
revenue source (the fund is added to a part of local allocation tax). Because borrowing by the 
postal savings special account was inherited by Japan Post in FY2003, it is not easy to grasp the 
basic overall trend, but on average, total government borrowing has increased by a little less 
than 10% per year, even excluding postal savings special accounts. 
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IV)  Local  Bonds 
      Though the local bond is a liability by the local government and distinguished from central 
government’s debt, it is not necessarily completely a self-responsible liability because of direct 
and indirect engagement by central government. There are various classifications of local bonds 
but the major ones are by (i) accounts or (ii) funds. In the case of grouping by account, there are 
bonds for the ordinary account, which is similar to the general account of central government 
(139 trillion yen as of end-FY2003), and local public corporations securities which finance funds 
for operations of local public corporations managed by local governments (62 trillion yen as of 
end-FY2003). One feature of local bonds is that many of them are substantially close to 
borrowing, following a form of debt with a certificate, in spite of their name, “bonds.” Genuine 
public-issued bonds that are issued publicly in the market make up only around 10% of the total. 
After the 1990s (especially FY1994) local bonds sharply increased owing to the sluggishness of 
tax revenue, cuts in taxes, and expansion of expenditure. In particular, the average annual 
growth rate of ordinary account securities since FY1990 has been around 8%. 
 
V)  Pension  Liability 
      Public pension is often considered as a kind of liability of the government but its character is 
quite different from those of other public debts. The nature of public pension as a liability itself 
is a major focus of discussion.     
   “Liability” in accounting is a current debt derived from past events and its realization is 
anticipated as an outflow of some resources, which brings about an economic benefit from 
companies. Thus present value of benefits that correspond to the past period is temporarily 
considered as a pension liability but there can be some standpoints depending on the extent the 
government is responsible. For example the “Japanese Government Balance Sheet” until FY2001 
cited how to appropriate debt amount of pension liability, with three points of view as follows: 
(i)  Future pension benefits corresponding to the past period are not recognized as liabilities, 
but solely reserves that the Government holds at present are recognized as the “deposits of 
public pensions” among liabilities on the balance sheet (158 trillion yen as of end-FY2001).  
(ii)  It is judged by revenue resource whether it is considered as a liability or not. Only reserves 
and Government subsidies are to be recognized as liabilities, since the future insurance 
premium income is expected to be paid by employers and contributors who are outside the 
Government under the current system (295 trillion yen as of end-FY2001).    
(iii)  In addition to Government subsidies, the Government has an obligation to raise future 
premiums to finance future pension benefits. Therefore, the total amount of the present 
value of benefits corresponding to the past period is to be recognized as liabilities on the 
balance  sheet.   
Further, Hatta and Oguchi(1993) also consider in their analysis of net pension liability that 
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which is equivalent to the current value of the benefit corresponding to the past premium.
11.  
      Opposing these views there are standpoints. Takayama (2004) includes the present value of 
benefits corresponding to the future period in the liabilities. That is, it includes also a 
lump-sum benefit calculated from employees’ pension payments insured by future premiums. In 
the paper, the benefit obligation for the past premium is estimated at 800 trillion yen and that 
for the future premium at 1,100 trillion yen (assumptions are as follows: wage growth: 1.0%, 
discount rate: 3.2%, premium: 13.58%; all of these figures are fixed and estimation is as of 
end-FY2004).
12. “Prospects and Policies about Social Security System of Japan in the 21st 
Century” (2004) by the Japan Center for Economic Research considers both the present value of 
benefit corresponding to the past period (720 trillion yen) and that corresponding to the future 
period (1420 trillion yen) as net pension liability, based on “Social Security Towards the 21st 
Century” (October 2000) by the government’s Deliberative Council of Experts on Modalities for 
the Social Security Structure.   
 
VI) Government-Guaranteed Debt 
   G o v e r n m e n t -guaranteed debt has the characteristic of a settled liability for the debtor 
(special corporation etc.) and as contingent liability for the guarantor (nation). There are bond 
types and borrowing types, as for government-guaranteed debts. Since the credit quality of 
government-guaranteed bonds is as high as that of the government bond, it is  handled as 
almost the same financial instrument as JGB in the financial market. The issue amount 
outstanding of government-guaranteed bond is 45 trillion yen as of end-FY2003. Representative 
institutions that issue these are: (i) Japan Finance Corporation for Municipal Enterprises (the 
proportion of outstanding in total public-issued is 46%), (ii) Deposit Insurance Corporation of 
Japan (25%), (iii) Japan Finance Corporation for Small and Medium Enterprise (8%), (iv) Japan 
Highway Public Corporation (6%).     
   On the other hand, the amount outstanding of government-guaranteed borrowings as of 
end-FY2003 is 13 trillion yen, and the overwhelming proportion (something over 80%) is 
occupied by the Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan.     
   Until  around  2000,  government-guaranteed debt showed a stable increasing trend but after 
2001 it reached its peak because of debt payments by the Deposit Insurance Corporation and a 
reduction in FILP agencies’ activities against the background of FILP reform.     
 
VII) FILP-Agency Bond 
   T h e   F I L P -agency bond, introduced during FILP reform in FY2001, is a bond that each special 
corporation etc. issues by itself without a government-guarantee. Generally, its spread is fairly 
small against the backdrop of credit quality of public institutions, while its maturity 
                                                                            
11  Hatta and Oguchi(1999), Nenkin-Kaikaku-Ron: Tsumitate-houshiki he Ikou Seyo, Nihon Keizai Shimbun. 
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and .commercial value is diverse. Such situation that credit ratings or spreads are advantaged 
compared with their financial positions is expressed as the existence of an “implicit 
government-guarantee” in the market.     
   An overwhelming number of the total bonds are issued by the Government Housing Loan 
Corporation. This corporation is planning to become an independent administrative institution 
whose main task is securitization support of lending in FY2006, and will issue RMBS 
(residential mortgage-backed securities) backed up with its own residential mortgage as 
FILP-agency bonds. Among other FILP agencies, for example, the issuance of the Japan Highway 
Public Corporation is noteworthy.     
   F I L P -agency bonds continue to rapidly increase, although the total amount outstanding 
itself is still small since the issuance started only a short time ago. Average growth in the two 
years since the beginning of issuance is 2.6 times above the previous year. This is due to the 
transfer of the previous FILP fund and does not mean an increase in net liability, but exposure to 
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A-1: Outline of JGB 
Ordinary Government Bond 
Name of debt 
Construction Bond  Special-Case Bond 
Fiscal Loan Fund 
Special Account Bond 
（FILP Bond） 
Other name  Article 4 Bond  Deficit-Financing 
Bond 
Fiscal Loan Bond 
Purpose 
Financing fund for 
government activity 




Financing Fiscal Loan 
Fund 
Subject for finance  General Account  General Account  Fiscal Loan   
Fund Special Account 
Maturity  6 months-30 years  6 months-30 years  2-30 years 
Character of product  coupon bond,   
discount bond 
coupon bond,   
discount bond  coupon bond 
Outstanding 
(as of end-FY2003) 
226.4 trillion yen  211.4 trillion yen  91.8 trillion yen 
Growth rate 





   N o t e ：Issuance of FILP bonds started in FY2001. 
 































Note: Difference between total ordinary bonds and the sum of construction bonds and deficit-financing 
bonds corresponds to Japan National Railways’ Debt refinancing bond, National Forest Service’s 
debt refinancing bond, and Local Allocation Tax – Succeeded debt refinancing bonds.   
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A-3: Outline of FB 
Financing Bill (FB) 
Name of Debt  Treasury 
Financing Bill 
Food Financing Bill,   
Foreign Exchange Fund Financing Bill, Etc. 
Other name  - Ryo-ken, Tame-ken, etc. 
Purpose  Covering temporary shortages of funds between revenue and 
expenditure  
Subject for finance  General 
Account 
Each Special Account 
-  7 special accounts have legal basis for 
issuance. Among them actual issues have been 
made for special accounts for (i) Food 
Control (Ryo-ken), (ii) Foreign Exchange 
Fund (Tame-ken), (iii) Petroleum and the 
More Sophisticated Structure of Demand and 
Supply of Energy Policies (Petroleum bill), 
(iv) Fiscal Loan Fund (Fiscal Loan Fund bill). 
-  Special accounts for National Forest Service 
and trade (re)insurance have legal provisions 
but have not actually been issued.   
Maturity  Basically 13 weeks (3 month) 
Character of product  Discount bond 
Outstanding 
(as of end-FY2003) 
86.1 trillion yen   
（Foreign Exchange Find Financing Bill: 85.0 trillion yen） 
Growth rate 
（FY90￿03 average） 13.6％ 
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A-5: Outline of Government Borrowing 
Name of Debt  Government Borrowing 
Purpose  Financing expenditure demand together with government bonds 
Subject for finance 
Mainly each special account (exceptionally, general account) 
-  At the end of FY2003 ten special accounts had outstanding amounts. 
In FY2004 nine special accounts undertook new borrowings. 
-  Borrowing of general account corresponds to succession from other 
accounts, such as former Japan National Railways’ debt.   
-  After FY2003 Japan Post succeeded to the large borrowings of the 
postal savings special account. 
Maturity 
・Temporary borrowings for financing temporal shortage of fund･･･
should be redeemed within the same fiscal year. 
・Borrowing in the narrow sense which finances shortages of revenue･･･
basically extends ever a number of fiscal years. Maturity varies 
depending on each special account.     
-  Local Allocation and Local Transfer Tax special account: mainly 
around six months, National Forest Service special account: five 
years, Measures For Petroleum and the Advance of Energy Demand 
and Supply Structure: six month, one year, etc. 
Character of product Borrowing on deeds as for auction. Also, in some cases, syndicated loans. 
Outstanding 
(as of end-FY2003)
60.6 trillion yen   
(Local Allocation and Local Transfer Tax special account: 48.5 trillion yen) 
Growth rate 
（FY90￿03 average）
Excluding postal savings special account: 8.4％ 
Including postal savings special account: 5.1％ 
 





















Source: Ministry of Finance, “Debt Management Report”, House of Councilors, Committee 
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A-7: Outline of Local Bonds 
Local Bonds 
Name of Debt 
Ordinary Account Bond  Local Public Corporations Bond 
Purpose  Financing revenue shortage of 
ordinary account 
Complementing revenue of local 
public corporations 
Subject for finance 
Ordinary account and special 
accounts, excluding public 
corporation account of local 
government 
Public corporation account of local 
government 
Maturity 
Basically 5–30 years 
-  maturity of major debt･･･Among private funds, public offering: 5, 10 
years / private subscription: 10–20 years, government funds: 5–30 
years, Japan Finance Corporation for Municipal Enterprises (JFM) 
funds: 5–28 years 
Character of product
Bond-styled or Deed-styled 
-  Public offering in private funds and some parts of private 
subscriptions are bond-styled. Government fund, JFM fund, and 
some part of private subscription are deed-styled. 
Outstanding 
(as of end-FY2003) 
138.7 trillion yen  61.5 trillion yen 
Growth rate 
（FY90￿03 average） 7.8％ 4.8％ 
 














Source: Ministry of Finance, “Debt Management Report”, House of Councilors, Committee 
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A-9: Outline of Pension Liability 
Name of Debt  Pension Liability 
Purpose 
Certain provision of funds utilizing insurance system in order to 
remove or reduce anxiety of members of society and secure their 
well-being 
Subject for finance  Central government (Welfare Insurance special account and 
National Pensions special account) 
Maturity  When each insured person satisfies eligibility requirement, such as 
reaching a certain age etc.   
Character of product  Annuity insurance 
Outstanding 
(as of end-FY2002) 
161.6 trillion yen 





A-10: Outline of Government-Guaranteed Debts 
Government-Guaranteed Debt 
Name of Debt 
Government-Guaranteed Bond  Government-Guaranteed 
Borrowing 
Purpose  Smoothing finance for operation by special public institutions, etc.   
Subject for finance  Government-related agencies such as special public institutions, 
independent administrative institutions, etc.   
Maturity 
・Medium-term bond (2, 4, 5, 6,or 
  7  years) 
・Long-term bond (10 years) 
Bilateral negotiation 
Character of product Coupon bond 
Basically syndicated loan and 
partly interest auction (Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, etc.) 
Outstanding 
(as of end-FY2003) 
45.0 trillion yen  13.3 trillion yen 
Growth rate 
（FY90→03 average） 3.3％ 10.2％ 
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Source: Ministry of Finance, “Annual Statistic Report on Government Bond (Kokusai Toukei 
Nempou,” “Debt Management Report 
 
 
A-12: Outline of FILP Agency Bonds 
Name of Debt  FILP Agency Bond 
Purpose  Financing funds necessary for activity of special public institutions, 
etc. 
Subject for finance 
Special public institutions, etc. (special public institutions, 
independent administrative institutions, and authorized organizations) 
-  FILP agency is a special institution, etc. that utilizes FILP funds 
Maturity  Medium-long term (2–30 years) 
Character of product Coupon bond (fixed-rate, floating-rate, and inflation-indexed) 
Outstanding 
(as of end-FY2003) 
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